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 Abstract 
The British people narrowly voted to leave the EU in June 2016, leaving the researchers 
with the difficult task of predicting an event that has never taken place before. This 
thesis aims to contribute to the research about Brexit by analyzing, using two different 
methods, the effects on UK exports to the EU in the scenario of it joining the EEA after 
leaving the EU. The first approach uses the estimation of the trade effects after the EU 
Enlargement in 1995, when Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EU from being 
members of the EEA, and mirror these effects to predict the impact on UK trade. The 
second method uses a measure of depth of trade agreements to estimate the effects of 
joining a less comprehensive trade agreement. A baseline gravity equation is estimated 
using fixed effects PPML as well as fixed effects OLS in both methods. The results show 
that the UK can expect a decrease in exports to the UK in the range between 19 % and 22 
% depending on method. This change equals an amount that is almost four times as high 
as the UK net contributions to the EU during the period 2015/2016. 
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1 Introduction  
In June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) voted narrowly to leave the European Union 
(EU) taking the first step towards being the first country ever to break the ties with the 
EU. This political event, commonly referred to as Brexit, is one of several recent 
examples of economic integration going backwards, which raises the question of how to 
estimate the effects of an event that has never taken place before.  
 
What drove the British people to vote for leaving the union that they have been part of 
for over 40 years? According to British media covering Brexit and to surveys conducted 
in connection with the referendum, the main argument for voting ‘Leave’ was to regain 
sovereignty and control over UK law and economy, as it is believed that too many of the 
decisions about the UK are taken in Brussels. Regaining control over immigration and 
UK borders, as well as eliminating the UK´s financial contribution to the EU was other 
arguments widely used by Eurosceptics before the referendum. In addition, it has been 
argued that the UK membership of the EU is keeping the UK from pursuing emerging 
markets like China or India, and that leaving the union would allow the UK to diversify 
its international links (The Telegraph, 2016: Lord Ashcroft, 2016: The Independent, 
2016). 
 
After the outcome of the referendum, the Brexit debate has largely focused on what will 
happen next, and what the UK’s options are outside the EU. This paper aims to 
contribute to the literature by analyzing the effects of Brexit on UK trade, and will do so 
by assuming that the best option for the UK is to retain as close ties with the EU as 
possible. Therefore, the trade effects will be estimated under the scenario that the UK 
will replace its membership of the EU with a membership in the European Economic 
Area (EEA). The rationale behind this is that less economic integration reduces trade, as 
trade barriers are increasing, and will in turn have negative welfare effects. In the 
situation where the UK remains as close as possible to the EU, the least severe will thus 
the trade reduction be compared to current situation. Assuming the best-case scenario 
makes it possible to give an approximation of what least to expect from Brexit in terms 
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of trade, as other scenarios by default will generate worse effects.  
 
As a country leaving the EU is an event that has never happened before, there is no 
established method to analyze the effects. This thesis will contribute to the research by 
analyzing Brexit using two different methods and further make a comparison of these 
methods to investigate if two very distinctive methods could generate similar results. In 
the first method I will estimate the trade effects of the EU Enlargement in 1995, when 
Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EU from being members of the EEA, and mirror 
these effects to predict the impact on UK trade. The EU 1995 Enlargement is the most 
similar historical event to the UK replacing its EU membership with a membership in the 
EEA, and will therefore be an appropriate proxy for the effects. The second approach 
focuses on how the content of trade agreements affects trade. By estimating how trade is 
affected by the depth of trade agreements in terms of number of legally enforceable 
provisions included, I intend to simulate the effects of the UK replacing its EU 
membership by a membership in the less deep agreement that is the EEA. I will use fixed 
effects Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood (PPML) and fixed effects Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) to estimate the gravity equation specified for the analysis.  
 
First, a detailed review is given of some of the options for the UK outside the EU, what 
they would mean in terms of the key arguments for the ‘Leave’ side, and economic 
effects. This is followed by a brief discussion about the best-case scenario for a 
replacement of the UK membership of the EU. Second, economic theory is used to 
explain the difference between a membership in the EEA and the EU, and how these 
differences affect trade. Third, a literature review is conducted that examines previous 
studies on the topic of Brexit. Thereafter, the empirical strategy is outlined, providing an 
insight of the methods used in the study, as well as a review of the gravity model, which 
is used to estimate the effects of the UK joining the EEA. Further, a suitable gravity 
equation is specified and methods of estimating the gravity model are discussed. Finally, 
the results obtained by estimating the gravity model are discussed and the scenario of 
the UK joining the EEA is simulated, providing an approximation of the effects on UK 
exports. My results indicate that the UK will experience a substantial decrease in exports 
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if its membership in the EU would be replaced with a membership of the EEA.  
2 Leaving the EU: What Comes Next for the UK? 
2.1 The UK Membership of the EU 
The deep integration of the EU that has evolved during the 20th century has resulted in 
the EU Single Market, intended to create a unified economy where all member states are 
to be treated equally (Baldwin et. al., 2015, pp. 45-46). The EU also forms a customs 
union between the member states. This means that all tariffs and quotas on goods trade 
within the EU are eliminated, reducing cumbersome border procedures. It also provides 
a common external tariff for goods imported from outside the EU. In addition, the EU 
Customs Union enables the European Commission to negotiate on behalf of all member 
states in the union in international trade deals. The EU has additionally contributed to 
reduce non-tariff barriers to trade within the union by harmonizing regulations, 
standards and specifications required to trade. The EU Single Market has provided the 
‘four freedoms’, liberating EU firms and citizens to sell goods, services and labor as well 
as to invest in other member states (CER Commission, 2014, pp. 22-27: HM Treasury, 
2016: Springford and Tilford, 2014).  
 
The UK currently has a special status within the EU, as they are not part of the Euro Zone 
or the Schengen area. However, it is a full-boarded member of the EU Single Market, the 
EU Customs Union, and participates in the EU’s economic decision-making. This deep 
integration has resulted in that the EU currently is the most important trading partner 
to the UK. Half of the UK’s goods exports and more than a third of services exports go to 
the EU. During the last decade, services trade has become increasingly important to the 
UK. The share of UK exports of services to the EU has more than doubled during the 
recent decades and the importance of value-added activities in the UK, for both services 
and manufacturing, has increased as well (HM Treasury, 2016: Mulabdic et. al., 2017). 
Not only does the EU provide access to important markets, as a customs union the EU 
facilitates access to markets outside of the union. The UK is represented in trade 
negotiations with third countries, as well as in multilateral trade negotiations, through 
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EU, which has been beneficial as the EU has great negotiating power being a large player 
in global trade (HM Treasury, 2016).  
 
By being a member of the EU, the UK has influence over EU decision-making including 
the rules associated with the EU Single Market. However, in return for market access 
and participation in the EU’s government arrangements the UK must accept the 
obligations of a membership including accepting the regulatory framework and 
contributing to the EU budget (HM Treasury, 2016).   
2.2 Membership of the European Economic Area: The Norwegian Solution 
Since its establishment in 1994 the EEA has served as a deep free trade area between 
the countries of the EU and three members of the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA); Norway, Lichtenstein and Iceland. This agreement allows the EFTA countries to 
be part of the EU Single Market and thereby to largely enjoy tariff free trade with the EU. 
However, the EEA is somewhat limited, as it does not cover agricultural and fishery 
policy, trade policy, foreign and security policy or justice and home affairs. Nor are the 
three EFTA countries part of the EU Customs Union, which is the main difference in 
market access compared to a EU membership (Emerson, 2016: Dhingra and Sampson, 
2016).   
 
An EEA membership could be an attractive option for the UK since it would still enjoy 
the economic benefits of being close to the EU but not participating in deeper European 
integration. The UK would maintain some market access by still being part of the EU 
Single Market and thereby benefit from the four freedoms. Even if Brexit for the UK 
would likely lead to reduced trade with the EU, the cost would be smaller if the UK 
remained more integrated with the EU. Although, the UK would be forced to comply 
with the rules and regulations of the EU Single Market without being able to participate 
in forming these, implying that the UK would have to give up some independence if 
joining the EEA. This could potentially be problematic as one of the main reasons for 
leaving the EU was to gain sovereignty and control. In addition, a membership of the 
EEA would mean that most of the EU policy areas are continuing to apply, including free 
movement of people, another key issue in the referendum campaign (Dhingra and 
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Sampson, 2016).     
 
Joining the EEA would also mean that the UK would lose access to all FTAs negotiated by 
the EU. On the other hand it would be free to negotiate trade deals independently, which 
could be viewed upon as gained sovereignty. In addition, as not being part of the EU 
Customs Union, the UK is able to set its own external tariffs towards third countries. 
However, this would mean that the UK must comply with Rules of Origin for exports to 
the EU and additional administrative costs associated with trade. Furthermore, the EU 
will be able to use anti-dumping measures against British firms in order to restrict 
imports (HM Treasury, 2016: Dhingra and Sampson, 2016).  
 
A membership in the EEA would reduce the UK´s financial contribution to the EU, 
although the financial savings would be rather small. In addition to membership fees, 
the participants of the EEA must contribute to the EU budget by paying a fee for being a 
part of the EU Single Market. As of today Norway pays only 17 % less fees to the EU than 
the UK, which implies that the larger part of the EU financial contributions would remain 
(Ashworth-Hayes, 2016: Dhingra and Sampson, 2016). 
2.3 Bilateral Agreements: The Swiss Solution  
Switzerland is the only EFTA member that is not also a part of the EEA. Its relationship 
with the EU is instead based on a number of bilateral agreements, one for each EU policy 
where Switzerland participates beyond the free trade agreement already covered by the 
EFTA membership. By negotiating bilateral agreements Switzerland has achieved nearly 
the same relation with the EU as the member countries of the EEA but has the advantage 
of being more flexible towards what policies and programmes in which they wish to 
participate. However, Switzerland is not part of the EU Single Market for services and 
there is no other agreement of trade in services between Switzerland and the EU, which 
has lead to that many Swiss financial institutions operate via the UK. Moreover, the UK 
would have to accept free movement of people, contributing to the EU budget and would 
not have access to the EU’s trade agreements with the rest of the world (HM Treasury, 
2016: Dhingra and Sampson, 2016).  
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Going for the Swiss solution could be beneficial for the UK in the sense that it provides 
largely tariff free trade with the EU but also greater flexibility regarding the extent to 
which the relationship with the EU will progress. However, as in the case of an EEA 
membership, the UK would have no influence in the forming of the EU policies and 
programmes they choose to participate in. This implies that there is a trade off between 
sovereignty and integration, where the UK will have to give up its influence over EU 
decisions to remain integrated in certain policy areas. On the other hand, even if the UK 
would pursue the Swiss model, there are no requirements for the EU to engage in any 
agreement with the UK. This means that the extent of the future relationship between 
the UK and the EU would be characterized by great uncertainty, leading to potential 
disadvantages for the UK (HM Treasury, 2016: Dhingra and Sampson, 2016). 
2.4 Comprehensive EU-UK Free Trade Agreement: The Canadian Solution   
The Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) is a relatively new trade 
agreement between the EU and Canada and currently serves as the most ambitious free 
trade deal the EU has ever negotiated1 (European Commission, 2017). This type of a 
‘second generation’ trade agreement could potentially be a solution for the UK when 
negotiating a new relationship with the EU. However, it is worth pointing out that no 
existing trade agreement reproduces the level of integration of the EU Single Market 
(Ruparel et. al. 2016).  
 
Within CETA, the EU and Canada have agreed upon eliminating all tariffs on industrial 
and fisheries products and over 90 % of tariffs on agricultural products. However, even 
though the CETA involves a reduction of almost all tariffs, some agricultural products 
still is considered sensitive and are not covered by the agreement (Booth et al., 2015). 
This implies that the UK will experience an increase in tariff rates from the EU under an 
agreement in line with the CETA. The agreement would probably also be less ambitious 
when it comes to services trade which for the UK would be harmful considering its 
comparative advantage in the service sector. The UK would also have to comply with EU 
Rules of Origin, which, together with other non-tariff barriers, will increase UK’s trade 
                                                      
1 CETA has not yet been approved by the EU national parliaments and is therefore not in full effect 
(European Commission, 2017). 
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costs with the EU. In addition, EU standards will apply on all export goods from the UK 
(LSE Growth Commission, 2017, pp. 60-62).  
 
Following an agreement in line with CETA, the UK would no longer be required to 
contribute to the EU budget or participating in the free movement of people. The latter 
will negatively affect the many UK citizens living and working in Europe as well as the 
Europeans living in the UK. However, it is likely that the EU have an interest in 
conditioning relatively free movement in exchange for UK access to the EU markets 
(Booth et al., 2015).  
 
Engaging in a trade agreement with the EU, the UK would gain political independency, 
although there is a clear trade-off between sovereignty and market access. Access to the 
EU market is more important for the UK than for Canada, as they are more dependent on 
the EU as a trading partner. In order to maintain EU market access, the UK would need 
to be involved in high levels of cooperation with the EU and thereby give up some 
independency. Moreover, when discussing a free trade agreement as the one between 
EU and Canada it is important to keep in mind that the UK currently is far more 
integrated with the EU than is Canada. This implies that a potential free trade agreement 
between the UK and the EU would inevitably have to cover areas of deeper integration 
(Booth et. al., 2015: Dhingra and Sampson, 2016). Leaving the EU, the UK would be free 
to negotiate trade agreements with third countries. However, it will at the same time 
have less bargaining power in the negotiations, as the UK is a much smaller market than 
the EU (LSE Growth Commission, 2017, pp. 60-62: Dhingra and Sampson, 2016).  
 
Another important point is that a comprehensive trade agreement like this would 
probably take many years to negotiate. CETA took more than six years to negotiate and 
was still close to failing, as it did not get approval from all member states at first. An 
agreement between the UK and the EU would likely face similar issues as CETA did 
(Ruparel et. al. 2016).  
2.5 EU Customs Union: the Turkish Solution   
The Customs Union between the EU and Turkey that came into force in 1995, allowed 
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Turkey to adopt the common external tariffs of EU imports and exports. This means that 
Turkey is able to enjoy tariff free trade with the EU in all industrial products while 
agricultural products are outside the customs union. Moreover, there is no freedom of 
movement of people between Turkey and the EU, and it is not bound by the EU’s 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) nor do they contribute to the EU budget (Dixon, 
2015).  
 
A scenario where UK leaves the EU but stays in the EU’s customs union could be an 
attractive solution for a potential Brexit, and has been discussed more frequently lately, 
at least as an option during a transitional period whilst a new deal with the EU is being 
negotiated. In the short run the UK could benefit from remaining in the customs union 
by preventing tariffs to be imposed on UK exports to the EU (Lythgoe, 2017). However, 
there are several drawbacks to this option in the longer run. The UK would be worse of 
in terms of market access as the customs union only covers trade in goods, not services 
or finance. Still it would have to comply with EU rules and regulations while having no 
say in the setting of these rules. In other words, it would have to give up some 
sovereignty in order to gain access to the EU Single Market (Dixon, 2015).   
 
As a country outside the EU, The UK would retain some access to the EU Single Market 
by joining the EU Customs Union. However, it will lose its independence of imposing its 
own external tariffs. Furthermore, it is required to adopt any trade policy that the EU 
decides on and to cut free trade deals on goods with whomever the EU makes 
agreements, without having a say in which free trade deals the EU pursues. In addition, 
countries outside of the EU may no longer have incentives to offer reduced tariffs for the 
UK, as they will be able to reach the British market going through the EU, which could 
make it more difficult for the UK to get access to non-EU markets (Dixon, 2015: Lythgoe, 
2017). 
2.6 Clean Break: The WTO Solution 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) serves as the only global international 
organization offering a structure for the exchange of liberalization commitments with a 
focus on multilateral trade negotiations. One of the major roles of the WTO is to 
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supervise trade rules between nations as well as forming these rules through 
multilateral negotiations. The WTO is governed by a set of agreements out of which the 
most important principle is the Most Favored Nation (MFN), stating that no member 
country should be treated less favorable than others. In practice, this means that all 
tariffs imposed by a country should be non-discriminatory (Baldwin and Wyplosz, 
2015).  
 
Assuming that the UK would leave the EU without joining the EFTA or negotiating any 
new trade agreements mentioned above, the UK’s trade with the EU, as well as with the 
rest of the world, would be governed by the WTO. Following WTO rules would mean 
that the UK must grant the same MFN tariffs to all WTO members, except for those 
countries with whom the UK possibly would enter free trade agreements. In this 
scenario the UK would have the same trade relationship with the EU as any other 
country and would thereby have to set a universal set of tariff rates to apply to all its 
trading partners. This could possibly harm UK firms if the tariffs are set too high; making 
imported input goods more expensive (LSE Growth Commission, 2017, pp. 60-62). 
Higher tariffs would also lead to increased export costs for UK firms to countries within 
the EU (Ottaviano et. al., 2014). On the other hand, imposing tariffs at EU levels or below 
would reduce import costs and increase competition for UK firms. However, the average 
import tariff to the EU is already low which leaves the UK with limited possibility for 
further tariff reductions. There is also a risk that the low tariffs will not be reciprocal, 
which would mean that the UK would lose bargaining power when negotiating future 
preferential trade agreements (LSE Growth Commission, 2017, pp. 60-62).   
 
In addition, trade in services would also be regulated by the WTO, which would be of 
disadvantage for the UK as the WTO has made less progress in liberalizing services trade 
than the EU. Also, there would be no free labour mobility between the UK and the EU, as 
the WTO has no requirements for free movement of people. However, free movement of 
capital would likely remain since the EU has forbidden any restrictions on capital 
mobility both within the EU and with third countries (Dhingra and Sampson, 2016).  
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In the WTO scenario the UK would gain political sovereignty, as the UK is free to 
redesign its economic policy and regulatory standards independently of the EU. 
However, UK trade regulations and competition policies that fail to comply with EU and 
WTO standards may lead to global trading partners imposing further restrictions on UK 
trade. This may negatively affect exports and will leave UK firms vulnerable to 
antidumping measures. Furthermore, as for all third countries, the UK would have to 
comply with EU product standards on all exports to the EU (LSE Growth Commission, 
2017, pp. 60-62). Less economic integration with the EU will in time also lead to 
regulatory divergence between the UK and the EU, which would act as a non-tariff 
barrier to trade and hence increase UK firms’ costs of doing business with the EU 
(Dhingra and Sampson, 2016).  
2.7 The Best-Case Scenario 
There are two main approaches to determine the best possible scenario for the future 
relationship between the UK and the EU, the first being the most beneficial scenario in 
economic terms, and the second where the key arguments in the Brexit debate are met. 
This paper will focus on the first approach assuming that the UK will be better off 
retaining as close ties with the EU as possible.  
 
Leaving the EU is likely to damage the UK economy by increasing trade barriers between 
the UK and the EU, however joining the EEA would lead to lower trade barriers than any 
of the alternative solutions. Remaining a part of the EU Single Market, basically no tariffs 
or other new border measures would exist between the EU and UK. Moreover, non-tariff 
barriers would be kept at low levels, as the UK would continue to adopt the EU’s trade 
and economic regulations. Common regulatory standards across the members of the EU 
Single Market helps keeping the non-tariff barriers low, which increases the gains of 
trade, especially for the service sector. Even though the UK would experience reduced 
independence in terms of influencing regulations, the benefits of regulatory 
harmonization would likely outweigh the costs of reduced control.  
 
The following empirical analysis in this paper will investigate what joining the EEA 
would mean for the UK in terms of trade. The next chapter provides a theoretical 
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discussion of the difference between a membership in the EEA and a membership in the 
EU, as well as the specific effects on trade in the case of the UK joining the EEA. 
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Table 1. An overview over the alternative Brexit scenarios 
 
 
Free trade 
in goods 
Free trade in 
services 
Customs 
union 
Independent to 
negotiate own trade 
deals 
Free movement 
of people 
EU rules and 
regulations 
EU policies and 
programmes 
Contributions 
to EU budget 
Current UK Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Opt out of some EU 
programmes 
Yes 
EFTA plus EEA: the 
Norwegian solution 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Opt out of some EU 
programmes 
Yes 
EFTA plus Bilateral 
Agreements: the Swiss 
solution 
Yes Limited No Subject to EU consent Yes Some 
Opt out of some EU 
programmes 
Yes 
Free Trade 
Agreement: the 
Canadian solution 
Mostly Limited No Yes No 
EU product 
standards on 
exports 
No No 
Customs Union: The 
Turkish solution 
Limited Limited Yes Yes No 
EU product 
standards on 
exports 
No No 
Clean Break: The WTO 
solution 
MFN tariffs Limited No Yes No 
EU product 
standards on 
exports 
No No 
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3 The Effects of the EEA Scenario on UK Trade  
As mentioned briefly in the previous chapter, replacing the EU membership with a 
membership in the EEA would lead to increased trade barriers between the UK and the 
EU. The EEA scenario would mean that the UK would have to leave the EU Customs 
Union, which would be the main difference in market access compared to EU 
membership. The consequences are that some new costs and non-tariff barriers will 
emerge between the UK and the EU. 
3.1 Regulatory Divergence  
In the EEA scenario, most of the EU regulatory framework would still apply to the UK. 
However, the UK would have little say over the design of the regulations. This will make 
it more difficult and costly for the UK to protect its trade interests. Further, if an EEA 
member fails to implement EU regulations, it risks suspension from the agreement. The 
increased regulatory costs may have a negative impact on UK trade, as the UK would 
have limited influence over EU trade policy (Springford and Tilford, 2014).  
 
Within the Single Market, a product that is legally sold in one EU country can be sold in 
another, even if it does not meet all of that country’s technical rules.  Post Brexit, this 
principle would no longer extent to the UK.  Instead, British exports would have to be 
proven to obtain all the regulatory approvals required from the country of import.  To 
do this, it would need to comply with all technical and safety rules in the EU importing 
country. This may raise additional trade costs for UK exporting firms if the UK does not 
continue to develop its regulations in line with the EU (European Commission, 2015).  
3.2 Rules of Origin  
As rules of origin are defining the sufficient level of processing needed to take place in a 
country in order for a product to be considered to have its origin there, they are linked 
to the preferences under a preferential trade agreement (PTA). The main purpose of 
establishing rules of origin is to prevent trade deflection, i.e. when third countries 
potentially could exploit trade preferences within a PTA by exporting through the 
country with lowest tariff rates. However, rules of origin act as non-tariff barrier to 
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trade as they have negative effects on trade flows and hence work in the opposite 
direction of preferences.  
 
The literature regarding the impact of rules of origin on trade flows usually distinguish 
between two different types of costs associated with complying with origin 
requirements; production costs and administrative costs. The former refers to the costs 
from having to change production in order to follow the technical criteria of the product-
specific rules of origin and can impact firms’ decisions regarding investments and 
sourcing. In order to comply with the rules of origin, firms are somewhat encouraged to 
use less efficient inputs from countries within the PTA instead of cheaper and more 
efficient inputs from outside the PTA. Hence, rules of origin potentially lead to trade 
diversion as firms move production facilities within the PTA even though they would 
prefer producers outside the region. In this way, rules of origin act as a non-tariff barrier 
to trade as it protects trade within the PTA and thereby distort trade with third 
countries. Administrative costs, on the other hand, are costs from having to prove or 
certify that the rules of origin are satisfied. These costs concern both the exporting 
country that has to certify the origin before exporting, and the partner country that must 
verify the product origin (National Board of Trade Sweden, 2012).    
 
Rules of origin apply to countries exporting to the EU from outside the customs union 
such as Norway, and hence the UK would have to comply with rules of origin in the EEA 
scenario. This will affect UK exports to the EU as both administrative and production 
costs increases. The increasing complexity of firms’ supply chains due to the ongoing 
globalization imply that the costs of certifying of a product are increasing, affecting UK 
firms. In addition, to comply with rules of origin EU producers might have to change 
suppliers from UK firms to suppliers within the EU, further reducing UK exports to the 
EU (Dhingra and Sampson, 2016: National Board of Trade Sweden, 2012).  
3.3 Anti-Dumping Measures 
Not being a part of the EU Customs Union makes UK firms subject to EU anti-dumping or 
anti-subsidy duties (Dhingra and Sampson, 2016). Anti-dumping policy is the main trade 
defense policy in practice and is an allowed instrument to use under WTO rules. This 
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means that EU is allowed to add an additional duty to a product being sold at a price 
below its ‘natural value’ at the EU market if domestic producers are negatively affected 
(European Parliament, 2017).    
3.4 Customs Procedures  
Cumbersome trade procedures work as a non-tariff barrier, as they make trade more 
expensive. The costs could be for instance complying with rules and quality controls, 
filling out complex forms, or delays in transportation (Persson, 2012). Since the UK, in 
the EEA scenario, will be excluded from the EU Customs Union it would be subject to EU 
border controls. This will generate new costs of trading, which in turn has negative 
effects on trade (National Border of Trade, 2016).  
4 Previous Research  
The following chapter will outline a few of the most relevant previously conducted 
studies of Brexit for this paper to give a broader picture of what the research has 
concluded so far.   
 
Ottaviano (2014) compares an optimistic Brexit scenario, assuming that UK obtains full 
access to the EU Single Market like Norway, with a pessimistic scenario where the UK 
have to fall back on WTO rules using a quantitative model of international trade together 
with a gravity model. The results show that the static economic losses range between 
1.13 % (optimistic scenario) and 3.09 % (pessimistic scenario) of GDP. When including 
dynamic effects the losses could potentially be more than the double. He additionally 
concludes that even though any Brexit scenario would generate negative trade effects, 
the costs are predicted to be smaller when the UK remains more economically 
integrated with the EU.  
 
Comparing an optimistic Brexit scenario (tariffs on goods continuing to be zero) and a 
pessimistic scenario (applying MFN tariffs), Dhingra et. al. (2016) use a general 
equilibrium trade model to predict the effects of Brexit. In their analysis they include 
different types of costs; tariffs, non-tariff barriers and opportunity costs. They estimate 
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that the negative trade effects range between 1.37 % (optimistic scenario) and 2.92 % 
(pessimistic scenario). They also show that other EU states lose as well but much less. 
Unilateral free trade could reduce the negative impact of Brexit by about 0,3 percentage 
points. 
 
In 2016 Oxford Economics released a report that considers nine Brexit scenarios, from 
staying in the EU Customs Union to falling back on WTO. Each option includes 
assumptions about liberal or protectionist policy approach. The results show that the 
economic losses of Brexit would be somewhere between 0.1 % and 3.9 % of GDP.  
Further the report concludes that both imports and exports decline in all cases although 
the scale of the decrease varies considerably across scenarios. Exports are predicted to 
fall by as much as 8.8 percent and imports by up to 9.4 percent in the worst-case 
scenario compared to a baseline of continued EU membership.  
 
Using a different approach, Mulabdic et. al. (2017) estimate a gravity model of what 
effects preferential trade agreements (PTA) have had on UK trade. Their approach is to 
incorporate the depth of various trade agreements to measure how much extra trade the 
deeper agreements has given the UK as oppose to less deep agreements. They further 
use these calculations to estimate how much less trade UK would experience under 
various possible Brexit scenarios. They find that deep trade agreements are expected to 
increase trade in goods and services with approximately 42 percent and value-added 
trade with 14 percent on average. As the membership in the EU is the deepest example 
of a UK trade agreement, it is expected to have a particularly strong effect on UK trade. 
The paper investigates three scenarios; a Norway solution, the scenario of the average 
PTA and if there were no agreement at all. All scenarios show decreasing UK value 
added trade with the EU between 6 and 28 percent. Focusing on the Norway scenario, 
the result shows that the UK could expect a decline in exports to the EU with about 12 
percent. 
 
Campos, Coricelli, and Moretti (2015) use a difference-in-difference method together 
with the synthetic control method to investigate the consequences of Norway’s decision 
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not to join the EU’s Customs Union and undertake the deeper integration pursued by EU 
countries in 1995.  In their analysis they construct a synthetic Norwegian region using 
data for Austria, Finland and Sweden and compare the productivity levels with actual 
Norway. They conclude that not joining the EU in 1995 has generated a productivity loss 
for Norway with about 6 %, implying that deeper economic integration are economically 
beneficial. 
 
Supporting this implication, the UK government also concludes in a report from 2016 
that the UK has benefitted from a more integrated relationship with the EU. The 
membership in the EU is expected to have generated a significant positive impact on 
overall UK trade. Due to that the EU has been the negotiating part in trade agreements 
with the rest of the world, UK trade, as a part of national income, has increased from 30 
% to 60 % since the years prior to the UK membership in the EU. In addition, being part 
of the EU is estimated to have generated an increase in UK trade with other EU members 
by about three quarters (HM Treasury, 2016).     
 
There seem to be a broad consensus among researchers that Brexit is likely to generate 
negative effects on the UK economy and on UK trade with the EU even though several 
different methodologies have been employed. Moreover, the effects seem to be less 
severe the more integrated the UK end up to be with the EU, supporting the assumption 
of the best-case scenario in this paper.  
5 Empirical Strategy 
With the assumption that becoming a member of the EEA would be the best option for 
the UK outside of the EU, and with the expectations that leaving the EU will generate 
negative trade effects for the UK, I will in this section outline my empirical strategy for 
testing this thesis. My strategy contains of two methods that will be estimated using the 
gravity model; the EU enlargement in 1995 and the depth of trade agreements.  
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5.1 Overview of Methods 
5.1.1 Method I: The EU Enlargement in 1995  
The 1995 enlargement of the EU saw Austria, Finland and Sweden accede to the EU from 
previously being part of the EEA by their membership in the EFTA. This was the EU’s 
fourth enlargement and came into force on the 1 January 1995. The estimation of the 
trade effects for Austria, Finland and Sweden following their EU memberships will in 
this study be used as proxies for the effects of replacing an EEA membership with an EU 
membership, and are assumed to be inversely proportional for the UK leaving the EU 
and instead joining the EEA. The expansion of the EU in 1995 is the most similar 
historical event to what is assumed to be the best-case scenario for the UK as a 
replacement of its EU membership, and therefore employs as a suitable strategy for 
estimating the effects of Brexit. All three countries have economies similar in size, and 
are geographically close to the UK, further implying that the UK would respond to this 
transformation in a similar way. Moreover, since the three countries acceded the EU in 
the same year, the estimation of the trade effects will be more reliable.  
5.1.2 Method II: The Depth of Preferential Trade Agreements 
During the last 25 years, the number of trade agreements in the world has increased 
drastically and the content of them has come to cover more policy areas comparing to 
traditional trade agreements, mainly focusing on reducing tariff rates. Since the 1990s, 
when many PTAs came into force, the number of trade agreements worldwide has 
increased from 51 in 1990 to 279 in 2015. In addition, the agreements have become 
deeper, i.e. the number of legally enforceable provisions covered by the agreements has 
increased from an average of between 8 and 9 provisions for PTAs in 1990 to an average 
of 17 provisions for PTAs between 2010 and 2015 (Mulabdic et. al., 2017).  
 
The World Bank (Hofmann et. al., 2017) is offering a new database containing all PTAs 
notified to the WTO and in force until 2015, providing information on the evolution of 
amount and depth of trade agreements. By counting the number of legally enforceable 
provisions in the 279 PTAs included, they have created a measure of the depth in trade 
agreements used in for instance Mulabdic et. al. (2017). A policy area that is considered 
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legally enforceable has a sufficiently precise language and is not exempted from PTA 
dispute settlement procedures (Hofmann et. al., 2017). Table 2 provides an overview 
over the 52 policy areas covered, divided into two groups of 14 WTO+ and 38 WTO-X 
areas.  
 
Table 2. List of Legally Enforceable Provisions 
WTO+  WTO‐X  
o Tariffs Industrial goods  o Anti‐corruption  o Health 
o Tariffs agricultural goods  o Competition policy  o Human Rights 
o Customs administration  o Environmental laws  o Illegal immigration  
o Export taxes  o IPR  o Illicit drugs  
o SPS measures  o Investment measures  o Industrial cooperation 
o State trading enterprises  o Labor market regulation  o Information society 
o TBT measures  o Movement of capital  o Mining 
o Countervailing measures  o Consumer protection  o Money laundering  
o Anti‐dumping  o Data protection  o Nuclear safety 
o State aid  o Agriculture  o Political dialogue 
o Public procurement  
o Approximation of 
legislation  
o Public administration 
o TRIMS measures  o Audiovisual  o Regional cooperation 
o GATS  o Civil protection  
o Research and 
technology 
o TRIPS  o Innovation policies  o SMEs 
 
o Cultural cooperation  o Social Matters 
 
o Economic policy 
dialogue  
o Statistics 
 
o Education and training  o Taxation 
 
o Energy  o Terrorism 
 
o Financial assistance  o Visa and asylum  
 
Based on the measure of depth using the count of legally enforceable provisions, the EU 
is the deepest PTA in force today. The EC Treaty2 together with the EU Enlargements3 
                                                      
2 The EC Treaty was originally signed on 25 March 1957 by Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands and West Germany and came into force on 1 January 1958. 
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covers all WTO+ provisions and a large share of the WTO-X provisions, adding up to a 
number of 44 legally enforceable provisions. The EU are also involved in PTAs with 36 
other countries, many of which are deep. For instance, the EEA that includes all 
members from the EU and EFTA covers 36 legally enforceable provisions.    
 
Using the measure of the depth in trade agreements allows me to investigate what effect 
the number of legally enforceable provisions included in the agreements have had on EU 
exports to the countries they are engaged in PTAs with. The result will give me an effect 
for engaging in a deeper trade agreement that can be used to simulate the effects on 
trade in the scenario where the UK leaves the EU and joins the EEA, i.e. where the 
number of provisions included is reduced from 44 to 36.   
5.2 The Gravity Model  
The gravity model is a commonly used method of statistical analysis of bilateral trade 
flows. The model originated in Newton's theory of gravity and was developed into a 
recognized economic model by Tinbergen in 1962. By linking trade flows directly to the 
economic size of countries and with trade costs, the gravity model captures regularities 
in the pattern of international trade (WTO and UNCTAD, 2012, pp. 103-105).  
In its initial formulation, the gravity model takes a multiplicative form expressed in 
equation 1, where 𝑇𝑖𝑗 represents trade flows between country 𝑖 and 𝑗 in proportion to 
the countries’ GDP, 𝑌𝑖 and 𝑌𝑗 , and inversely to the bilateral distance, 𝐷𝑖𝑗 . 𝛽0, 𝛽1, 𝛽2, and 𝛽3 
are unknown parameters. The importer’s and exporter’s GDP are used as proxies for the 
countries’ demand and supply, and the distance variable represents bilateral trade costs 
between the country pair (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).  
To simplify the estimation of the gravity model, the equation is commonly transformed 
into its natural logarithmic form, expressed in equation 2. This enables the use of the 
ordinary least square (OLS) estimation (WTO and UNCTAD, 2012, p. 104).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
3 Since the EC Treaty, the EU's membership has grown to twenty-eight, with the latest member state 
being Croatia, which joined in July 2013. 
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𝑇𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑌𝑖
𝛽1
𝑌𝑗
𝛽2
𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝛽3
     (1) 
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗   (2) 
 
The logarithmic form of the gravity equation allows the estimated coefficients to be 
interpreted as elasticities i.e. the percentage change in the dependent variable following 
a one percent change in one of the independent variables, all others equal. However, for 
dummy variables, the effect from going from 0 to 1 is found by calculating the estimated 
coefficient using exp(𝑏) − 1, where 𝑏 is the estimated coefficient (WTO and UNCTAD, 
2012, p. 106). 
5.3 Gravity Model Specification  
In order to estimate the trade effects of going from being part of the EEA to becoming a 
member of the EU, I have specified a gravity model where the dependent variable is 
exports from the EU. The independent variables included are the importer’s and the 
exporter’s GDP and population, the distance between the country pair’s capitals, 
dummies for whether the country pair shares a common official language and if the 
country pair shares borders.  Moreover, year-specific fixed effects are included as well as 
effects for the bilateral pair. 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a disturbance term. 𝑖 is the importer, 𝑗 is the exporter, 
and 𝑡 denotes time. The included variables are some of the most commonly used in the 
gravity model literature and are widely considered to give the model a good fit. Using 
commonly employed variables makes the result of the paper easier to compare to other 
studies.  
 
In the first method, the regression is estimated using panel data from 1990 to 2000, and 
the exporting and importing countries are the members of EU12 as well as Austria, 
Finland and Sweden. The countries included are listed in section A2 of the Appendix. For 
this method, the main independent variable of interest is the EU dummy, taking the 
value one if both countries in a bilateral pair are members of the EU, and zero otherwise. 
This variable is meant to capture the effects of the EU15 enlargement for the three 
countries joining the EU in 1995. The gravity equation for method I is expressed in its 
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natural log form in equation 3.  
 
𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑚𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽8𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜆𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
(3) 
 
The second method uses panel data that covers the period 1990 to 2015. The exporting 
countries are the members of the EU28, and the importers are all countries that EU has 
PTAs with. The importing and exporting countries included are listed in section A3 of 
the Appendix. By including a depth-variable, the model explicitly account for the depth 
of EU and of the PTAs the EU has with third countries. This is the main variable of 
interest for this method and intends to capture the effect of signing a deeper agreement 
on EU exports. Equation 4 expresses the gravity equation for method II in its natural log 
form.  
 
𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡)
2 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑜𝑚𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽9𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜆𝑖𝑗
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
(4) 
 
A list of the variables and their sources are found in the appendix, section A1.  
 
The dependent variable, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡, is exports from the EU. The data is from the 
Eurostat’s (2017) database on international trade. Since data over imports is considered 
to be more reliable (WTO and UNCTAD, 2012), I have chosen to use data over imports 
rather than exports for the first method. This is possible considering that the exporting 
countries are the same as the importing countries in this method. However, in order to 
minimize risk of missing or defective data, I have for the second method used data over 
exports, as data over imports to many of the countries engaged in PTAs with the EU was 
unavailable.   
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𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 , is a dummy variable taking the value one if both countries in a bilateral pair are 
members of the EU, and zero otherwise.  This variable is intended to capture the effect of 
going from being part of the EEA to becoming a member of the EU. The effect takes place 
when Austria, Finland and Sweden are going from being members of the inner market to 
begin full EU membership in 1995. Previous research has given support to the idea that 
joining the EU would generate positive effects on trade between member countries, 
hence the coefficient of the EU dummy is expected to take a positive value. This variable 
is manually constructed by the author.  
 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the number of legally enforceable provisions in the PTA between 𝑖 and 𝑗, and 
intends to capture the effect of signing a deeper PTA on EU exports. As engaging in a 
trade agreement that covers more policy areas most likely increases trade between the 
partner countries, the coefficient is expected to take a positive value. The variable is 
from the content of PTAs dataset constructed by Hofmann et. al. (2016). One thing to 
keep in mind with this model is that the effect of an additional provision is considered to 
be the same regardless of what type of provision is included.  Although, it is more 
realistic to assume that some provisions has larger effects on trade between partners in 
a PTA than others. Taking this into account, I include the square of the depth-variable, 
(𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡)
2, in order to test if the relationship might be non-linear.    
 
The importing country’s as well as the exporting country’s GDP, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 and 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 , are 
used as proxies for the economic sizes of the exporting and importing countries. Both 
the importer’s and the exporter’s GDP are expected to have positive effects on exports 
from the EU, as a larger GDP represents a larger demand for imports or a larger supply 
of exports, respectively. The GDP data is expressed in nominal Euro, and is from the 
CEPII (2017a) database.  
 
The coefficient 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 and 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗𝑡, are the importing country´s and the exporting country’s 
population sizes, and can take either a positive or negative value. The population size 
may have a negative impact on exports if the country export less when the population 
increases due to an increased rate of intra-trade, or a positive effect if it exports more as 
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it expands, being able to achieve economies of scale (Walsh, 2006). The data is from the 
CEPII (2017a) database.    
 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 measures the distance in kilometers between the country pairs’ capital cities. 
This variable is one of the most commonly used proxies for trade costs, as it is believed 
to be more costly to trade with countries farther away. The variable is expected to have 
a negative impact on exports. The data is from the CEPII (2017b) database.   
 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 is a dummy variable and takes the value one when the country pair shares a 
common official or primary language, and zero otherwise. Countries that share a 
common official or primary language are likely to trade more than countries that do not, 
as sharing a common language may decrease trade costs since communication becomes 
easier and less costly. The variable is expected to have positive impact on exports. 
Similarly, 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗, is also expected to have a positive impact on exports. The dummy 
variable, taking the value one if the country pair has a common border, and zero 
otherwise, are likely to decrease trade costs. The data on the two dummy variables are 
from the CEPII (2017a) database.  
 
Time fixed effects, 𝜏𝑡 , is included to account for variations between the years in the 
sample. This variable is intended to capture various year-specific events that may affect 
trade flows, which are not accounted for by the other variables. 𝜆𝑖𝑗 , is a fixed effect for 
the bilateral pair, intended to capture specific characteristics for a bilateral country pair 
that may affect trade between the two.  
5.4 Data 
The gravity equations specified in the previous section will be estimated for exports at 
an aggregated level to offer a broad picture of how UK trade will be affected by joining 
the EEA. However, to provide a more detailed analysis of the trade effects, I will in 
separate estimations use disaggregated export data according to the Harmonized 
System (HS) at a two-digit level as a dependent variable.  
The Harmonized System is an internationally standardized system of names and 
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numbers to classify traded products. The HS is organized into 96 chapters, which are 
further divided into more detailed subcategories. The system divides products as 
detailed as at an 8-digit level (World Customs Organization, 2017). An example of a 
product chapter at a two-digit level could be “Beverages, spirits and vinegar” (22), and a 
subcategory at a 6-digit level could then be “Sparkling wine of fresh grapes” (220410). 
To make the results easier to interpret, I will construct dummy variables for four 
broader product sections, Agriculture, Raw material, Manufactures, and Miscellaneous, 
and estimate the effects of EU membership and depth of trade agreements for each of 
these sections. A review of the HS product chapters and sections are found in the 
appendix, section A4.   
One thing to note when using the gravity model with disaggregated data is that some of 
the logics behind the gravity model are not entirely straightforward. Large countries 
usually trade more as they produce more varieties of goods, hence trade volumes are 
increasing with GDP. However, this might not be the case for the individual product, 
which indicates that the coefficient for the exporters GDP might not be significant for all 
product chapters. In addition, zero trade flows are more likely to occur with 
disaggregated data, an issue that will be discussed further in the next section of the 
paper (WTO and UNCTAD, 2012, p. 114). 
5.5 Method of Estimation 
There are many methods to choose from when estimating the gravity model, each one 
with its own advantages and disadvantages. This section will review some of the most 
common issues when estimating the gravity model and outline the choice of estimation 
method for this study.  
5.5.1 Unobserved Heterogeneity 
When estimating gravity models, one often has to deal with unobserved heterogeneity 
(WTO and UNCTAD, 2012, p. 107).  Unobserved heterogeneity emerges when there are 
some unobserved differences between individuals (between bilateral country pairs in 
this study), which is not accounted for in the model. This causes the estimation to 
become biased and will affect the standard errors when using OLS. With panel data, this 
problem can be dealt with by using country pair fixed effects. However, using a fixed 
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effects model comes at a cost, as degrees of freedom will be lost (Dougherty, 2007, pp. 
411-413).  
5.5.2 Endogeneity 
The endogeneity problem refers to when one or more of the explanatory variables are 
correlated with the error term. This causes the estimated coefficients to be inconsistent. 
Common causes of endogeneity are measurement error, simultaneity or omitted 
variables (Dougherty, 2011, p. 333). There is a possibility that either of the gravity 
models in this study could suffer from endogeneity. For instance, it is obvious that the 
countries joining the EU in 1995 already had a well-established trade relationship with 
the EU members before their decision to become members. This indicates that the error 
term and the EU dummy could be correlated. Using fixed effects can partly solve the 
presence of endogeneity, although only endogeneity caused by omitted variables (WTO 
and UNCTAD, 2012, p.).  
5.5.3 Heteroskedasticity 
Heteroskedasticity refers to when the variance of the error term is not constant for all 
observations and makes the estimation inefficient. When estimating the gravity model, 
heteroskedasticity is typically a problem (Shepherd, 2013, p. 51). One solution to the 
problem of heteroskedasticity is to use robust standard errors (Shepherd, 2013, p. 28). 
However, using OLS on the logarithmic version of the gravity equation in presence of 
heteroskedasticity would still lead to an inconsistent estimation. A more appropriate 
solution is to estimate the gravity equation in its multiplicative form using a non-linear 
estimation like PPML (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).  
5.5.4 Zero Trade Flows 
As mentioned in previous section, disaggregated data usually contains many zero trade 
flows, which usually means that there is no reported bilateral trade in a specific product 
chapter during that year. Using OLS on the logarithmic version of the gravity model 
could lead to significant biases in the result, as all zeros will be dropped when taking the 
natural log of the trade volume. As zero trade could be due to high trade costs, dropping 
the zeros could lead to that some useful information is lost if trade actually is zero (WTO 
and UNCTAD, 2012, p. 112). To avoid this problem, one can instead use a non-linear 
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model such as PPML, as this enables the model to be estimated in its multiplicative form, 
and hence all zeros will be included (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).  
5.5.5 Choice of Estimation Method 
In order to make sure that the result is robust, the gravity equations in this study will be 
estimated using different estimation methods. Robust standard errors are used in all 
estimations, reducing the issue of heteroskedasticity. 
 
The main method of estimation for the baseline gravity equations (3) and (4) is a PPML 
model with fixed effects for bilateral pair, product chapter and year. By using PPML, the 
gravity equation can be estimated in its multiplicative form and the issue of zero trade 
flows is avoided. The fixed effects are intended to capture unobserved heterogeneity for 
the bilateral pairs, the product chapters and over years. Including bilateral pair fixed 
effects means that all bilateral variables are dropped when estimating the model, as they 
are perfectly collinear with the fixed effects.  
 
The effects of the gravity model are commonly estimated using fixed effects OLS. To 
make this paper easier to compare with previous studies, and in order to test the 
robustness, I will estimate the gravity equations with OLS using bilateral pair, product 
chapter, and year fixed effects. However, OLS has some disadvantages in comparison to 
the PPML method when it comes to handling zero trade flows and heteroskedasticity.  
 
The estimations with disaggregated data will also use a fixed effects PPML model as the 
main method of estimation. However, instead of including fixed effects for bilateral pair, 
I will have fixed effects for bilateral pair and product chapter to capture specific effects 
for every combination of exporter, importer and product chapter. Making the filter this 
narrow makes the coefficients for the dummy variables for each product section to be 
more reliable. As in the previous regressions, I will include year fixed effects.  
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6 Empirical Results  
6.1 Method I: The EU Enlargement in 1995 
The baseline model is estimated with aggregated export data using bilateral pair fixed 
effects PPML. The results are found under column (a) in table 3. The estimated 
coefficient for the EU dummy is 0.201, displaying the expected sign, i.e. acceding EU 
membership from being part of the EEA increases exports to the EU countries. The 
result is significant at a one per cent level. When estimating the gravity equation using 
OLS, displayed in column (b) in table 3, the result are very similar (0.215) and is 
significant at a one per cent level. The coefficient from the OLS estimation will be used to 
simulate the effects of the UK replacing its EU membership with a membership in the 
EEA, as it simplifies the calculations and interpretation. 
 
Column (c) in table 3 shows the result from the fixed effects PPML model using 
disaggregated export data. The coefficients for the EU dummy variable are separated 
into four product sections to investigate if the effects of joining the EU had different 
effects on different products. The coefficients for agriculture, raw material and 
manufactures are all significant at a one per cent level. However only agriculture and 
manufactures has positive signs (0.280 and 0.0764 respectively), indicating that the 
countries joining the EU in 1995 all experienced increased exports in these product 
sections. The coefficient for raw material, on the other hand, has a negative sign (-
0.122), which implies that exports to the EU for this section decreased as Austria, 
Finland and Sweden joined the EU. This result is somewhat unexpected but could 
possibly be reasonable if the EU agreement in some way disadvantages trade in raw 
material or if the countries are changing its export portfolio to the EU countries after 
joining the union. The fourth product section, miscellaneous, has a positive coefficient 
but is not significant. This could be because the range of products included in this 
section is so different from each other that there is no clear effect.  
 
The estimated coefficient of the importer’s and the exporter’s GDP is positive in all three 
estimations, which is in line with economic theory. However it is not significant for all 
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estimations. The poor result could possibly be explained by the combination of 
relatively low time series variation in the GDP data and the bilateral fixed effects. The 
estimated coefficient for the importer’s and the exporter’s population is highly 
significant in all estimations, indicating that larger EU countries export more. Due to the 
bilateral pair fixed effects, the variables distance, common language and common border 
are omitted, as they are constant over time.    
 
Table 3. Method I: Regression results  
Dependent variable: Exports 
(a) 
PPML 
(b) 
OLS 
(c) 
PPML 
        
EU 0.201*** 0.215*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
EU*Agriculture 
  
0.280*** 
 
  
(0.000) 
EU*Raw material  
  
-0.122*** 
 
  
(0.000) 
EU*Manufacturing 
  
0.0764*** 
 
  
(0.008) 
EU*Miscellaneous 
  
0.0878 
 
  
(0.388) 
GDP importer 1.746 4.265*** 0.258*** 
 
(0.135) (0.007) (0.000) 
GDP exporter 2.229* 0.551 0.126** 
 
(0.081) (0.731) (0.039) 
Population importer 0.291*** 0.411*** 4.356*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population exporter 0.344*** 0.305*** 5.261*** 
 
(0.000) (0.006) (0.000) 
N observations 
 
2,045 
 
2,045 
 
222,541 
N groups 210 210 19,649 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bilateral pair effects Yes Yes No 
Bilateral pair and product chapter effects No No Yes 
P-values in parentheses (based on robust standard errors) 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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6.2 Method II: The Depth of Trade Agreements 
The results from the baseline estimation are presented in table 4. Using bilateral pair 
fixed effects, the dummy variables for distance, common language and common border 
are omitted due to collinearity. In column (a), the results from the fixed effects PPML 
estimation with aggregated export data is displayed. The estimated coefficient for the 
depth variable shows, as expected, a positive sign (0,0284). This implies that exports 
increases with deeper trade agreements in terms of legally enforceable provisions. The 
OLS estimation in column (b) confirms this results, although the coefficient differs 
slightly (0,0323). Both estimations are significant at a 5 per cent level. The results from 
the OLS estimation will be used in the simulation in section 6.4. The coefficient for the 
squared depth variable is significant at a 5 per cent level in the PPML estimation and at a 
10 per cent level in the OLS estimation. This indicates that there might be a non-linear 
relationship between exports and depth of trade agreements, although it is difficult to 
interpret this coefficient.  
 
In column (c), the results for the fixed effects PPML with disaggregated data are 
displayed. The coefficients for agriculture, raw material and miscellaneous are all 
positive and significant at a 10 per cent level, and for manufactures it is positive at a 5 
per cent level, which means that deeper trade agreements seem to have positive effects 
on exports in all sections.  
 
The coefficients for the exporter’s GDP are negative in both PPML estimations, which is 
goes clearly against my theoretical predictions that larger countries trade more. 
However, it is positive in the OLS estimation and also significant at a 10 per cent level. 
The estimated effects on the importer’s GDP are all insignificant. The coefficients for the 
exporter’s population are all positive and significant at a one per cent level, while the 
coefficient for the importer’s population is only significant in the PPML estimation with 
disaggregated data, although negative.  
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Table 4. Method II: Regression results 
Dependent variable: Exports 
(a) 
PPML 
(b) 
OLS 
(c) 
PPML 
    Depth 0.0284** 0.0323** 
 
  (0.032) (0.013) 
 
Depth squared -0.0006** -0.0006* -0.0005** 
 
(0.036) (0.054) (0.044) 
Depth*Agriculture 
  
0.0267* 
   
(0,054) 
Depth*Raw material 
  
0.0264* 
   
(0.054) 
Depth*Manufactures 
  
0.0281** 
   
(0.041) 
Depth* Miscellaneous 
  
0.0237* 
   
(0.087) 
GDP exporter -0.285** 0.1354* -0.233* 
 
(0.046) (0.059) (0.098) 
GDP importer -0.0063 -0.892 0.0348 
 
(0.959) (0.182) (0.0760) 
Population exporter 1.749*** 2.336*** 1.673*** 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Population importer -0.0646 -0.8923 -0.786** 
 
(0.106) (0.182) (0.050) 
    N observations 2,188 2,516 4,879,488 
N groups 524 852 2,026 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bilateral pair effects Yes Yes No 
Bilateral pair and product chapter effects No No Yes 
P-values in parentheses (based on robust standard errors) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: As a robustness test, the baseline gravity equation was additionally estimated with fixed effects 
PPML and fixed effects OLS with additional specific effects for product chapter generating similar results 
for the depth variable.  
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6.3 Summary of Results 
The theoretical prediction of the first method was that joining the EU from being part of 
the EEA would generate positive effects on exports. Both the fixed effects PPML 
estimation and the fixed effects OLS estimation of the baseline model with aggregate 
exports data confirm this. The prediction of the second method that deeper trade 
agreements are leading to increased exports, are also confirmed by both the fixed effects 
PPML estimation and the fixed effects OLS model. In addition, the estimated coefficients 
for the EU variable and the depth variable are significant at a one percent level, and a 
five per cent level respectively, making the results rather robust.  
 
However, the estimations of the gravity equations using disaggregated data did not 
generate as reliable results. At best the results imply that there are likely to be dissimilar 
effects on different product sections but whether the effects are positive or negative, and 
the size of the effects are not clarified by this analysis.  
6.4 Simulating the Effects of the UK Leaving the EU 
The effects of the UK replacing its EU membership with a membership of the EEA are 
simulated using the estimated coefficients from the two different methods used in this 
study. To get the most reliable results and to make the simulations from the two 
methods comparable, the coefficients from the fixed effects OLS estimation with 
aggregated exports data are going to be used. The results from the simulations are 
presented in table 5.  
 
It is important to note that the exact quantitative effects of the UK leaving the EU and 
joining the EEA might differ slightly than the chosen estimate (I obtained coefficients 
ranging from 0.201 to 0.215 in the first method, and 0.0284 to 0.0323 in the second 
method depending on the method of estimation). The aim is therefore not to provide the 
exact quantitative effect of the UK joining the EEA but to give an approximate idea of the 
potential trade effects.  
 
The predicted value of the export volume is used to simulate the effect of the UK joining 
the EEA from being part of the EU. I have calculated the predicted value of exports by 
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fixating the EU variable and the depth variable to its values for the EU4 and the EEA5 
respectively, and all other control variables to its mean values6. In the next step I 
translated the natural log of the export volume to its actual value, to be able to calculate 
the percentage change in exports following that the UK are going from being part of the 
EU to become member of the EEA, using equation 4.  
 
% 𝛥 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 =  
(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝐸𝐸𝐴 − 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝐸𝑈)
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝐸𝑈
 
(4) 
 
The simulation for the first method resulted in a decrease of the UK export volume to the 
members of the EU with 19,3 %. The UK’s total exports to the EU amounted to 
approximately 195 000 000 000 Euro during 2016 (Eurostat, 2017). A decrease in UK 
export volume with 19,3 % equals about 38 000 000 000 Euro. The simulation gives 
similar results when calculating the percentage change in exports using the depth 
variable from the second method. The simulation resulted in a percentage change equal 
to 22,7 %. This is the decrease in exports to the EU that the UK can expect by joining an 
agreement with 8 less legally enforceable provisions than the EU, i.e. joining the EEA. 
Expressed in Euro, this equals about 44 000 000 000, just slightly different from the first 
method. Put into perspective, these values are almost 4 times as much as the UK net 
contribution to the EU budget during the period 2015/2016, which amounted about 11 
400 000 000 Euro (Keep, 2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
4 The value for the EU is in the first method 1 and the second method 44.  
5 The value for the EEA is in the first method 0 and in the second method 36. 
6 I have made use of the margins command in Stata for calculating the predicted values. 
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Table 5. Simulating the effects of the UK joining the EEA 
 
Method I: The EU Enlargement in 1995 Method II: The Depth of Trade Agreements 
 
Percentage 
change in UK 
exports to the EU 
Change in nominal 
exports to the EU 
(nominal Euro) 
Percentage 
change in UK 
exports to the EU 
Change in nominal 
exports to the EU 
(nominal Euro) 
 
    
Aggregated 
exports 
-19.3% -37 569 586 548 €  -22.7% -44 287 379 732 € 
     
 
When using the fixed effects OLS estimations with aggregated data, the simulations are 
implying that the UK can expect substantial negative effects on its exports to the EU 
when leaving the union. As joining the EEA are assumed to be the best-case scenario for 
the UK outside of the EU in economic terms, the results also indicates that this probably 
is the least to expect from Brexit. Given that both methods are providing similar results 
in the simulations, the results are rather robust.  
7 Conclusion  
The intention for this paper was to investigate the impact on UK exports to the EU after 
leaving the EU and instead pursuing the best option outside the union. The best-case 
scenario was in this paper argued to be the option where the UK joins the EEA, keeping 
as close ties with the EU as possible.  
 
I have used two methods in this paper in an attempt to predict the effects on UK exports 
to the EU, both estimating the gravity equation using fixed effects PPML, and fixed 
effects OLS, with aggregated export data. The first approach was to estimate the effects 
of the EU 1995 enlargement, when Austria, Finland, and Sweden went from being 
members of the EEA and instead accede EU memberships. By mirroring the results from 
this estimation, I came to the conclusion that the UK could expect a decrease in exports 
to the UK with 19,3 %. The other approach generated similar results but was based on a 
different method. Using the measure of the depth of trade agreements provided by 
Hofmann et. al. (2016), I estimated the effects on exports when engaging in a deeper 
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agreement. By engaging in an agreement containing of 8 less legally enforceable 
provisions, i.e. joining the EEA, the UK exports to the EU are expected to decrease with 
22,7 %. As this paper were analyzing the best-case scenario for the UK outside the EU, 
any other option will likely lead to an even larger loss in UK exports to the EU. The 
results from this paper are however not to be interpreted as the exact quantitative 
effects of the UK replacing its EU membership with one in the EEA, but rather to give an 
approximate idea of the size of the decrease in exports. 
 
I also estimated the gravity equations with fixed effects PPML using disaggregated data 
to investigate whether the effects on exports differ for different product sections. The 
results from these estimations were however rather weak, although they indicate that 
different product sections will be affected differently following Brexit. The extent of the 
differences is however not clarified in this paper but could be an interesting analysis for 
a future research. 
 
The results from this paper are in line with previous research on the topic of Brexit, 
suggesting that leaving the EU will have substantial negative effects on UK-EU trade. 
Mulabdic et. al. (2017), for instance, came to the conclusion that the ‘Norwegian 
solution’ would decrease UK exports to the EU with approximately 12 %, which is a 
result in the same direction as the one obtained from this analysis. The results from this 
paper are however suggesting an even more severe trade reduction following Brexit, 
supported by two different methodological approaches. In addition, this paper makes a 
methodology contribution to the Brexit research by showing that two very distinct 
analytical methods are generating similar results.  
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9 Appendix 
A1. Variables and Data Sources 
 
  
Variable Definition and Data Source 
Imports Imports in nominal Euros. Data source: Eurostat (2017). 
Exports Exports in nominal Euros. Data source: Eurostat (2017). 
EU dummy Constructed by author. 
Bilateral distance 
Distance in km between capital cities in two countries. Data 
source: CEPII (2017). 
GDP 
GDP in nominal Euros. Data source: CEPII (2017). Converted 
from USD using data from Eurostat (2017). 
GDP per capita Data source: CEPII (2017). 
Common border 
Dummy variable that is equal to unity if two countries share a 
common border. Data source: CEPII (2017).  
Common official language 
Dummy variable that is equal to unity if two countries share a 
common official or primary language. Data source: CEPII 
(2017). 
Common currency 
Dummy variable that is equal to unity if two countries have the 
same currency. Data source: CEPII (2017). 
Depth of PTAs 
The count of legally enforceable provisions included in a PTA. 
Data Source: The content of trade agreements database 
constructed by Hofmann et. Al. (2016).  
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A2. Exporting and Importing Countries: Method I 
 
  Importing and exporting countries 
Austria Italy 
Belgium Luxembourg 
Denmark Netherlands 
Finland Portugal 
France Spain 
Germany Sweden 
Greece United Kingdom 
Ireland 
  
A3. Exporting and Importing Countries: Method II 
 
 
Exporting countries Importing countries 
Austria Albania Italy 
Belgium Algeria Jamaica 
Bulgaria Andorra Jordan 
Croatia Austria Latvia 
Cyprus Bahamas Lebanon 
Czech Republic Barbados Lithuania 
Denmark Belgium Luxembourg 
Estonia Belize Macedonia 
Finland Bosnia and Herzegovina Madagascar 
France Bulgaria Malta 
Germany Cameroon Mauritius 
Greece Chile Mexico 
Hungary Colombia Moldova 
Ireland Costa Rica Morocco 
Italy Cote d’Ivoir Netherlands 
Latvia Croatia Nicaragua 
Lithuania Cyprus Norway 
Luxembourg Czech Republic Palestine 
Malta Denmark Papua New Guinea 
Netherlands Dominica Peru 
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Poland Dominican Republic Poland 
Portugal Egypt Portugal 
Romania El Salvador Romania 
Slovakia Estonia San Marino 
Slovenia Faroe Islands Seychelles 
Spain Fiji Slovakia 
Sweden Finland Slovenia 
United Kingdom France South Africa 
 
Georgia South Korea 
 
Germany Spain 
 
Greece Suriname 
 
Grenada Sweden 
 
Guatemala Switzerland 
 
Guyana Syria 
 
Honduras Trinidad and Tobago 
 
Hungary Tunisia 
 
Iceland Turkey 
 
Ireland United Kingdom 
 
Israel Zimbabwe 
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A4. Harmonized System: Sections and Product Chapters 
 
Section 1  Agriculture 47 
Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulosic material; recovered 
(waste and scrap) paper or paperboard.  
52 Cotton.  
1 Live animals. 49 
Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the 
printing industry; manuscripts, typescripts and plans.  
53 
Other vegetable textile fibres; paper yarn and woven fabrics of 
paper yarn.  
2 Meat and edible meat offal.  68 
Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar 
materials.  
54 Man-made filaments.  
3 
Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other 
aquatic invertebrates.  
69 Ceramic products.  55 Man-made staple fibres.  
4 
Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey; 
edible products of animal origin, not 
elsewhere specified or included.  
70 Glass and glassware. 56 
Wadding, felt and nonwovens; special yarns; twine, cordage, 
ropes and cables and articles thereof.  
5 
Products of animal origin, not elsewhere 
specified or included. 
71 
Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, 
precious metals, metals clad with precious metal and articles 
thereof; imitation jewellery; coin. 
57 Carpets and other textile floor coverings.  
6 
Live trees and other plants; bulbs, roots and 
the like; cut flowers and ornamental foliage.  
72 Iron and steel.  58 
Special woven fabrics; tufted textile fabrics; lace; tapestries; 
trimmings; embroidery.  
7 
Edible vegetables and certain roots and 
tubers.  
73 Articles of iron or steel.  59 
Impregnated, coated, covered or laminated textile fabrics; 
textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use.  
8 
Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or 
melons.  
74 Copper and articles thereof.  60 Knitted or crocheted fabrics.  
9 Coffee, tea, maté and spices.  75 Nickel and articles thereof.  61 
Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or 
crocheted.  
10  Cereals.  76 Aluminium and articles thereof.  62 
Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or 
crocheted.  
11  
Products of the milling industry; malt; 
starches; inulin; wheat gluten.  
77 (Reserved for possible future use in the Harmonized System)  63 
Other made up textile articles; sets; worn clothing and worn 
textile articles; rags.  
12  
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous 
grains, seeds and fruit; industrial or medicinal 
78 Lead and articles thereof.  64 Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles.  
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plants; straw and fodder. 
13  
Lac; gums, resins and other vegetable saps 
and extracts.  
79 Zinc and articles thereof.  65 Headgear and parts thereof.  
14 
Vegetable plaiting materials; vegetable 
products not elsewhere specified or included.  
80 Tin and articles thereof.  66 
Umbrellas, sun umbrellas, walking-sticks, seat-sticks, whips, 
riding-crops and parts thereof.  
15 
Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their 
cleavage products; prepared edible fats; 
animal or vegetable waxes. 
81 Other base metals; cermets; articles thereof.  67 
Prepared feathers and down and articles made of feathers or of 
down; artificial flowers; articles of human hair.  
16  
Preparations of meat, of fish or of 
crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic 
invertebrates.  
83 Miscellaneous articles of base metal. 84 
Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical 
appliances; parts thereof.  
17  Sugars and sugar confectionery. Section 3 Manufactures 85 
Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound 
recorders and reproducers, television image and sound 
recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such 
articles. 
18  Cocoa and cocoa preparations. 28 
Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic compounds of precious 
metals, of rare-earth metals, of radioactive elements or of 
isotopes.  
86 
Railway or tramway locomotives, rolling-stock and parts 
thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings and 
parts thereof; mechanical (including electro-mechanical) traffic 
signalling equipment of all kinds.  
19  
Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; 
pastrycooks' products. 
29 Organic chemicals.  87 
Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling-stock, and parts 
and accessories thereof.  
20  
Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or 
other parts of plants. 
30 Pharmaceutical products.  88 Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof.  
21  Miscellaneous edible preparations. 31 Fertilisers.  89 Ships, boats and floating structures. 
22  Beverages, spirits and vinegar. 32 
Tanning or dyeing extracts; tannins and their derivatives; dyes, 
pigments and other colouring matter; paints and varnishes; putty 
and other mastics; inks.  
Section 4 Miscellaneous 
23  
Residues and waste from the food industries; 
prepared animal fodder. 
33 
Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery, cosmetic or toilet 
preparations.  
90 
Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, 
precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts 
and accessories thereof.  
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24  
Tobacco and manufactured tobacco 
substitutes 
34 
Soap, organic surface-active agents, washing preparations, 
lubricating preparations, artificial waxes, prepared waxes, 
polishing or scouring preparations, candles and similar articles, 
modeling pastes, "dental waxes" and dental preparations with a 
basis of plaster.  
91 Clocks and watches and parts thereof.  
Section 2 Raw Material  35 Albuminoidal substances; modified starches; glues; enzymes. 92 Musical instruments; parts and accessories of such articles. 
25  
Salt; sulphur; earths and stone; plastering 
materials, lime and cement. 
36 
Explosives; pyrotechnic products; matches; pyrophoric alloys; 
certain combustible preparations.  
93 Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof. 
26  Ores, slag and ash.  37 Photographic or cinematographic goods. 94 
Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions 
and similar stuffed furnishings; lamps and lighting fittings, not 
elsewhere specified or included; illuminated signs, illuminated 
name-plates and the like; prefabricated buildings.  
27  
Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of 
their distillation; bituminous substances; 
mineral waxes. 
38 Miscellaneous chemical products. 95 
Toys, games and sports requisites; parts and accessories 
thereof.  
44 Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal.  40 Rubber and articles thereof. 96 Miscellaneous manufactured articles. 
45 Cork and articles of cork.  50 Silk.  97 Works of art, collectors' pieces and antiques. 
46 
Manufactures of straw, of esparto or of other 
plaiting materials; basketware and 
wickerwork. 
51 
Wool, fine or coarse animal hair; horsehair yarn and woven 
fabric.    
